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Domestic Relations
by By Andrew B. McClintock*
Allison C. Kessler **
Barry B. McGough ***
And Elinor H. Hitt ****
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article reviews opinions impacting the practice of criminal law
delivered by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Georgia
Supreme Court covering the period of June 1, 2019, up until May 21,
2020. This Article is designed to be a mere overview to both prosecutors
and defense attorneys of decisions and new statutes, and it serves as a
broad guideline to how these decisions will affect their practices.in the
State of Georgia in the first quarter of 2020 and continuing through the
end of the survey period. 1
II. LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
While the 2020 legislative session was cut short by the outbreak of
the novel coronavirus, significant legislation passed during the 2019
session went into effect during the survey period. As discussed in last
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(J.D., 2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate, Warner Bates. University of Georgia (B.S, B.A., 2011); Georgia State
University (J.D., 2018). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Partner, Warner Bates. University of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University
of California (LL.B., 1966). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**** Partner, Warner Bates. University of Georgia (B.S.Ed., 1993); Georgia State
University (J.D., 2007). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1 See Ga. Exec. Order 07.31.20.01: Renewal of Public Health State of Emergency (July
31, 2020), available online at https://gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executiveorders/2020-executive-orders; Fourth Order Extending Statewide Judicial Emergency, S.
Ct. of Ga. (July 10, 2020), available online at https://www.gasupreme.us/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/4th-SJEO-FINAL.pdf.
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year’s survey, 2 Georgia’s new “equitable caregivers” statute, O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-3.1, 3 went into effect on July 1, 2019, and provides a new path to
legal custodial and visitation rights for persons acting in dedicated
parental roles for children with whom they do not have a formal legal or
biological relationship. 4 No decisions construing or applying the
equitable caregiver law have been issued by the higher courts at the time
of this writing. Effective July 1, 2019, O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-22 5 and 19-9-23 6
were amended to provide that a party may bring a counterclaim for
modification of legal or physical custody in response to a complaint
seeking a modification of the same. 7 The intent of the amendment is to
permit counterclaims for modification to be asserted against complaints
for modifications or contempt actions seeking to enforce a child custody
order. 8 The child support guidelines codified at O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 9 were
also amended effective July 1, 2019, to make certain grammatical and
terminology corrections, to remove alimony as a specific child support
deviation in some circumstances, and to exclude certain adoption benefits
from gross income. 10
Additionally, the Living Infants Fairness and Equality Act (LIFE) 11
was scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 2020, making changes to
numerous provisions of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated intended
to enhance the rights of unborn children and their parents by revising
the laws governing abortion and providing protections and benefits to an
unborn child with a detectable heartbeat. 12 Among other things, it would
have permitted unborn children with detectable human heartbeats to be
“included in population based determinations,” 13 and for the parents of
such children to seek and receive child support for medical and
pregnancy-related expenses. 14 However, on June 28, 2019, a federal
lawsuit was brought against the Governor and State of Georgia
challenging the constitutionality of the LIFE Act under

See McGough et al., supra note 1 at 92–93.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1 (2020).
4 See id.
5 O.C.G.A. § 19-9-22 (2020).
6 O.C.G.A. § 19-9-23 (2020).
7 Ga. S.B. Bill 190, Reg. Sess., 2019 Ga. Laws 281.
8 See id.
9 O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (2020).
10 Ga. H.B. Bill 381, Reg. Sess., 2019 Ga. Laws 219.
11 Living Infants Fairness and Equality (LIFE) Act, Ga. H.B. Bill 481, Reg. Sess., 2019
Ga. Laws 234.
12 See generally, id.
13 O.C.G.A. §§ 1-2-1(d), (e) (2020).
14 LIFE Act § 5 (amending O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(a)(4)(a.1)(2)).
2
3
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 15 by a coalition of plaintiffs comprised of “SisterSong
Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective, seven reproductive
health care clinics, and three individual physicians.” 16 On October 1,
2019, the federal district court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining
the LIFE Act from going into effect pending the final resolution of the
case. 17
III. CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
Many opinions issued by the higher courts during the survey period
serve to clarify Georgia’s law with respect to child custody, child support,
and the modification of each.
In Belknap v. Belknap, 18 pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(5), 19 the
father of a fourteen-year-old son petitioned the court for modification of
child custody and support, seeking primary custody of the child on the
basis of the child’s election to live with him. Following the parties’ 2011
divorce in Georgia, the father moved to Florida while the parties’ two
minor children remained in the Atlanta area with the mother. When the
younger child turned fourteen, he informed the father that he wished to
move in with him, leading the father to file the petition and affidavit of
election at issue. Despite the child’s election, the trial court denied the
petition for modification of custody and issued a final order that did not
address the child support modification. The father appealed on the
ground that the court erred in failing to honor the child’s affidavit of
election despite determining him to be a fit parent and in neglecting to
modify child support based on a material change in the needs of the
child. 20 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. 21
While a prior version of O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3 22 provided that the election of
a child aged fourteen or older was controlling unless the court determined
that the selected parent was unfit, the current language of O.C.G.A.
§ 19-9-3 and subsection (a)(5) specifically contains no reference to
parental fitness; instead, a child’s election is presumptive and may be
overridden if the trial court finds that the custody election is not in the
child’s best interest. 23 The trial court made such a finding and, therefore,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2020).
Women of Color v. Kemp, No. 1:19-cv-02973-SCJ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124699, at
*16 (N.D. Ga. July 13, 2020).
17 Id.
18 351 Ga. App. 748, 833 S.E.2d 135 (2019).
19 O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(5) (2020).
20 Belknap, 351 Ga. App. at 748–50, 833 S.E.2d at 135–38.
21 Id. at 756, 833 S.E.2d at 142.
22 O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(4) (2006).
23 Id. at 752–53, 833 S.E.2d at 139–40; see O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(5).
15
16
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refused to honor that the child’s election was not an abuse of discretion. 24
Further, because the child support modification relied on a change of
custody which was not granted, and the father did not pursue a ruling
one way or the other regarding child support, the court of appeals
determined that the father waived his claim of error regarding child
support. 25
Wertz v. Marshall 26 involved a dispute under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) 27 as to jurisdiction
for modification of custody. 28 The parties were divorced in Florida and
the mother was awarded physical custody of the two minor children. Six
years after the divorce, the younger of the children moved to Georgia to
live with the father, and the father filed a petition in Georgia to modify
the Florida custody award to grant him sole and permanent custody of
the child. In the mother’s answer, she admitted to being a resident of
Colorado (where her new husband, a member of the military, was
stationed temporarily) and that the Walker County Superior Court had
jurisdiction over the modification. She subsequently moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that Florida had retained exclusive jurisdiction to
modify the custody award, but the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss based upon the jurisdiction admissions in her answer. 29
The court of appeals affirmed and held that the mother’s admission in
judicio was properly treated as conclusive and the fact that no parties
remained in Florida divested that state of jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA. 30 However, Presiding Judge (and, at the time of this writing,
Chief Judge) Christopher McFadden dissented on the ground that the
UCCJEA imposes a higher burden of proof than an admission in an
unverified pleading before a court may be deemed to have lost continuing
exclusive jurisdiction over a custody matter. 31 As the Wertz decision is
merely persuasive, rather than binding precedent under Georgia Court
of Appeals Rule 33.2, 32 it would be prudent for future litigants faced with
Belknap, 351 Ga. App. at 753, 833 S.E.2d at 140.
Id. at 754–55, 833 S.E.2d at 141.
26 351 Ga. App. 108, 830 S.E.2d 491 (2019).
27 O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40 to 19-9-104 (2020).
28 Wertz, 351 Ga. App. at 108, 830 S.E.2d at 492.
29 Id. at 108–09, 830 S.E.2d at 492–93.
30 Id. at 109–10, 830 S.E.2d at 493.
31 Id. at 110–11, 830 S.E.2d at 493–94 (McFadden, P.J., dissenting).
32 Under the former Rules of the Georgia Court of Appeals, an opinion by a three-judge
panel that included a dissent was considered physical precedent only and thus not binding;
however, effective March 30, 2020, the court of appeals amended Rule 33.2 such that,
effective August 1, 2020, “a published opinion in which a majority of the judges fully concur
in the rationale and judgment of the decision is binding precedent.” Ga. Ct. App. R. 33.2
(Judgment as Precedent).
24
25
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similar jurisdictional disputes to consider the arguments and positions
set forth in the dissent. 33
IV. CONTRACTS
In Dovel v.
the Georgia Court of Appeals held, under O.C.G.A.
§ 19-6-2, 35 that a waiver of alimony provision contained in the parties’
divorce settlement agreement precluded an award of attorney’s fees. 36
The parties settled the case before trial, and the settlement agreement
contained an alimony waiver provision stating that “[e]ach party waives
and forever relinquishes any claims and rights each has or may have to
alimony, maintenance[,] and support of any nature from the other . . . .” 37
The settlement further provided that the issue of attorney’s fees would
be reserved for later determination by the court. At the hearing on
attorney’s fees, the wife’s counsel asserted that she sought attorney’s fees
under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2; the husband’s counsel objected to such an award
on the basis that it was precluded by the waiver of alimony in the
settlement agreement. The trial court granted the wife’s request and
ordered the husband to pay fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, and the
husband appealed. 38
On review, the court of appeals affirmed the principle that attorney’s
fees authorized by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 “are considered to be a part of
alimony.” 39 As such, the broad waiver of alimony in the settlement
precluded an award of attorney’s fees in the nature of alimony. 40
Interestingly, the wife did not contest that the alimony waiver barred an
award of fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2. Rather, she argued that the
reservation of attorney’s fees despite the alimony waiver created
ambiguity in the agreement as to whether the parties intended fees to be
available under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2. 41 Applying general principles of
contract construction and noting that the wife could have sought and
been
awarded
attorney’s
fees
under
O.C.G.A.
§ 9-15-14 42
notwithstanding the alimony waiver, the court of appeals determined
that construing the agreement so as to permit an award of attorney’s fees
Dovel, 34

Wertz, 351 Ga. App. at 110, 830 S.E.2d at 493.
352 Ga. App. 423, 834 S.E.2d 918 (2019).
35 O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 (2020).
36 Dovel, 352 Ga. App. at 423, 834 S.E.2d at 918.
37 Id. at 425, 834 S.E.2d at 920.
38 Id. at 424–25, 834 S.E.2d at 919–20.
39 Id. at 425, 834 S.E.2d at 919 (quoting Vakharwala v. Vakharwala, 301 Ga. 251, 254,
799 S.E.2d 797 (2017)).
40 Id. at 427, 834 S.E.2d at 921.
41 Id. at 425, 834 S.E.2d at 920.
42 O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (2020).
33
34
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in the nature of alimony would improperly invalidate the waiver
provision; as such, the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees under
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2. 43 This case effectively affirms the substantive rule of
the 2019 case Ford v. Ford, 44 which is considered persuasive physical
precedent only, and presents an important consideration: if a contractual
waiver of alimony is effective to bar an award of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 fees in
the divorce litigation, it should be presumed effective in post-divorce
litigation, such as enforcement or contempt actions as well—even where
the post-judgment contempt arises from another issue in the divorce,
such as property division. 45 Attorneys and litigants who wish to preserve
the possibility of a fee award under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 in subsequent
litigation should consider including an express exception for attorney’s
fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 in the alimony waiver provision of any
settlement agreement they draft or execute. 46
A former wife appealed from the trial court’s order enforcing an
antenuptial agreement and awarding attorney’s fees to her former
husband under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 based upon her challenge to the
enforcement of the agreement in Lynch v. Lynch. 47 The record showed
that the former wife worked for one of the former husband’s companies
when they started dating and then lived together for approximately two
and a half years before getting married. The former husband presented
the former wife with a copy of the agreement shortly before they traveled
to Hawaii to get married, advised her to retain counsel, and provided her
funds to do so. While she did retain counsel, she never thoroughly
discussed the agreement with him and received no meaningful advice
before executing it two days before the wedding. While the agreement
contained a list of the former husband’s properties and businesses, and a
statement of their respective approximate net worth and annual incomes,
it did not contain an attached financial disclosure of formal financial
statements. 48 The former husband filed for divorce approximately fifteen
years later, and after a hearing on his motion to enforce the agreement,
the trial court found it enforceable under the criteria established in
Scherer v. Scherer 49 and awarded attorney’s fees to the former husband
Dovel, 352 Ga. App. at 427, 834 S.E.2d at 921.
349 Ga. App. 45, 825 S.E.2d 449 (2019) (physical precedent only).
45 Id. at 50, 825 S.E.2d at 454; (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 authorizing an award of
attorney’s fees “as a part of the expenses of litigation” in actions “for alimony, divorce and
alimony, or contempt of court arising out of either an alimony case or a divorce and alimony
case, including but not limited to . . . orders involving property division, child custody, and
child visitation rights . . . .”)
46 Ford, at 50, 825 S.E.2d at 454.
47 351 Ga. App. 160, 160, 828 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2019).
48 Id. at 161–62, 828 S.E.2d 462–63.
49 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982).
43
44
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under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14. 50 The former wife appealed on the grounds
that the agreement failed to satisfy the first prong of the Scherer test—
which requires a full and fair disclosure of the parties’ assets—and that
the award of attorney’s fees was improper. 51
The court of appeals affirmed the enforcement of the prenuptial
agreement under Scherer. 52 Georgia does impose an affirmative duty of
disclosure prior to execution, but the list of properties and businesses and
estimates of the former husband’s net worth and annual income included
in the body of the agreement satisfied his disclosure obligation even
though it did not contain a separate schedule identifying all of his
assets. 53 The adequacy of his disclosure was bolstered by evidence of their
pre-existing relationship and cohabitation, their travel together, and her
work as an employee of one of his businesses, and the trial court did not
err by enforcing the agreement in its entirety. 54 However, it was error to
award attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 against the former wife
without specifically identifying the sanctionable conduct forming the
basis of the award. 55
V. POST-JUDGMENT RELIEF
The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed a number of procedural and
substantive challenges in McLaws v. Drew. 56 There, the wife brought a
contempt petition against her former husband for failure to pay child
support and various expenses due under the final judgment and decree
of divorce. During a break in the contempt hearing (which was not
transcribed), the former husband began experiencing symptoms of a
heart attack and was driven to the hospital by counsel. The husband’s
attorney returned to court, explained the situation, and requested a
continuance. However, the court denied the request and subsequently
entered an order finding the husband in willful contempt of the parties’
divorce decree, requiring him to pay the sum of his arrearages and
attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 by November 5, 2018, and
providing for his immediate arrest and detention if he failed to pay the
full sum. 57
On November 5, 2018, the former husband filed a motion for new trial
or, in the alternative, to set aside and for reconsideration based upon, (1)
Lynch, 351 Ga. App. at 161–62, 828 S.E.2d at 463.
Id. at 162–63, 828 S.E.2d at 463.
52 Id. at 164–65, 828 S.E.2d at 464–65.
53 Id. at 163, 828 S.E.2d at 463–64.
54 Id. at 164–65, 828 S.E.2d at 464–65.
55 Id. at 166, 828 S.E.2d at 466.
56 355 Ga. App. 162, 843 S.E.2d 440 (2020).
57 Id. at 163, 843 S.E.2d at 442–43.
50
51
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the trial court’s failure to grant a continuance following his medical
emergency; (2) the trial court’s admission of evidence on a claim for
backpay of support for which he did not receive notice in the former wife’s
pleadings; (3) the trial court’s failure to consider certain admissions in
judicio made by the wife; and (4) the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees
without testimony or evidence and without considering the parties’
respective financial circumstances. 58 Despite the automatic supersedeas
effect of the motion for new trial—which the former husband’s attorney
expressly brought to the attention of the trial court—the former husband
was arrested and incarcerated for failing to satisfy the contempt order.
The trial court declined to enter an order releasing him, instead requiring
him to pay over half of the sum due and ordered him released by consent
after he made such a payment. The former husband then filed a motion
seeking the trial judge’s recusal based upon the repeated violation of his
due process rights, including the refusal to continue the contempt
hearing and his incarceration despite the supersedeas effect of the
motion for new trial. The trial court subsequently denied both of the
former husband’s pending motions, and upon request of the former wife,
awarded attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) 59 against the former
husband and his attorney. 60 The attorney against whom the fees were
awarded sought discretionary review, and the court of appeals reversed
the award of attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14. 61
On review, the court of appeals found “no merit” in the trial court’s
conclusions that the motion for new trial “was baseless in every respect;”
“deficient and lacked legal authority;” “failed to comply with Uniform
Superior Court Rules;” and that under U.S.C.R. 25.3, 62 the former
husband had “failed to satisfy conditions” for recusal. 63 In pertinent part,
the court of appeals rejected the argument that the former husband had
failed to specify a statutory basis for the motion for a new trial because
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(c) 64 provides one, and further noted that while
“motions for a new trial are available only to challenge some ‘intrinsic
defect’ that does not appear on the face of the record or pleadings, ‘errors
allegedly committed by the trial court’ constitute such an intrinsic
defect.” 65 The court of appeals determined that the arguments asserted

Id. at 164, 843 S.E.2d at 443 (emphasis added).
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2020).
60 McLaws, 355 Ga. App. at 164–66, 843 S.E.2d at 444.
61 Id. at 162, 843 S.E.2d at 442.
62 U.S.C.R. 25.3 (2020).
63 McLaws, 335 Ga. App. at 166, 843 S.E.2d at 445.
64 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(c) (2020).
65 McLaws, 335 Ga. App. at 167, 843 S.E.2d at 445 (quoting Gulledge v. State, 276 Ga.
740, 741, 583 S.E.2d 862, 864 (2003)).
58
59
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in the motion for new trial did not lack substantial justification so as to
authorize an award under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) because the former
husband had due process rights to be notified of the claim for payment of
back child support against him and to be heard in defense of the claims
against him. 66 Thus, the former husband’s claims of violation of due
process rights were not baseless or lacking justification. 67
Further, the court of appeals held that the request for recusal did not
lack substantial justification even if the accompanying affidavits were
arguably insufficient because the record reflected that the trial court had
overlooked established law twice to incarcerate the former husband,
violating his due process rights—first, by issuing an “impermissible
self-executing contempt order” that deprived him of his right to be heard
on the issue of willfulness, and second, by ignoring the supersedeas effect
of the motion for new trial and permitting him to be jailed for violation of
the superseded order. 68 Finally, the court failed to remedy its own
violation of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-62(b), 69 which provides for supersedeas upon
the filing of a motion for new trial, and instead conditioned the former
husband’s release on the payment of a portion of the fees he challenged. 70
Accordingly, the court of appeals determined that neither motion was
lacking in substantial justification and reversed both attorney’s fees
awards under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b). 71
The former husband in Rowles v. Rowles 72 moved to set aside the
parties’ final judgment and decree of divorce based on duress, alleging
that he had only agreed to settlement terms because his former wife
threatened to expose his extramarital affair to his employer which could
have caused his termination and loss of significant deferred
compensation. After a hearing, the trial court partially granted the
motion and set aside portions of the settlement agreement relating to
custody, parenting time, and visitation while denying the motion to set
aside as to the financial provisions of the agreement. The court then held
a trial on the issues of custody, support, and visitation and entered a
Final Order granting custody of the children to their father. The former
wife moved for a new trial, which the court denied, and the trial court
later awarded the husband $112,189.10 in attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A.
§§ 19-6-2 and 9-15-14(b). The former wife appealed, challenging the trial
court’s ruling on the former husband’s motion to set aside on procedural
Id. at 167–68, 843 S.E.2d at 445–46.
Id. at 168, 843 S.E.2d at 446.
68 Id. at 169, 843 S.E.2d at 447.
69 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-62(b) (2020).
70 McLaws, 355 Ga. App. at 170, 843 S.E.2d at 447.
71 Id. at 170, 843 S.E.2d at 447–48.
72 351 Ga. App. 246, 830 S.E.2d 589 (2019).
66
67
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and substantive grounds as well as the award of attorney’s fees against
her. 73
Procedurally, the former wife argued that the trial court erred in
ruling on the former husband’s motion to set aside because it was not
filed during the same term of court as the judgment it challenged and
should have been brought as a separate action. 74 The court of appeals
rejected both arguments based upon the plain language of O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-60(f), 75 which provides a three-year window to attack judgments
for fraud and does not require that such challenges be brought as
separate actions. 76 Substantively, however, the court of appeals agreed
with the former wife that the trial court erred in setting aside the second
divorce decree based upon duress. 77 Georgia law distinguishes between
setting aside a contract for duress and setting aside a judgment for
duress, and imposes a higher bar on the latter: “Before . . . a judgment
will be set aside for duress, it must appear that the complainant had a
good defense which [he] was prevented from asserting at the original
hearing or trial.” 78 Here, the record did not show—and the former
husband did not argue—that he was prevented from asserting a good
defense by the former wife’s alleged threats to reveal his conduct to his
employer. 79 Accordingly, it was improper for the trial court to set aside
the parties’ settlement agreement which had been incorporated into the
divorce decree. 80 The court of appeals additionally noted, without
deciding as to the facts at hand, that “it has long been held that ‘[a] threat
of causing the defendant to lose his job or his fear of such loss is not
duress which would void the contract,’ when the threat is not otherwise
wrongful or unlawful.” 81
VI. POST-JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT
In Sponsler v. Sponsler (Sponsler III), 82 a consolidated appeal
following remand from the Georgia Supreme Court in the 2017 case of

Id. at 247–48, 830 S.E.2d at 590–91.
Id. at 248, 830 S.E.2d at 591.
75 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(f) (2020).
76 Rowles, 351 Ga. App. at 248, 830 S.E.2d at 592; see O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(b), (d), (f).
77 Rowles, 351 Ga. App. at 249, 830 S.E.2d at 592.
78 Id. at 249, 830 S.E.2d at 592 (alteration in original) (quoting Frost v. Frost, 235 Ga.
672, 675, 221 S.E.2d 567, 570 (1975)).
79 Id. at 250, 830 S.E.2d at 593.
80 Id. at 251, 830 S.E.2d at 593.
81 Id. at 250 n.10, 830 S.E.2d at 593 n. 10 (alteration in original) (quoting Atlanta Life
Ins. Co. v. Mason, 89 Ga. App. 319, 321, 79 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1953)).
82 353 Ga. App. 627, 838 S.E.2d 921 (2020).
73
74
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Sponsler v. Sponsler (Sponsler II), 83 the former husband, the appellant,
challenged the trial court’s imposition of criminal contempt sanctions
against him, refusal to reimburse him for sums allegedly due under the
divorce decree, and award of attorney’s fees to the court-appointed
receiver in the case and his ex-wife. 84 On appeal, the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the finding of criminal contempt despite the appellant’s
challenge that a “presumption of vindictiveness” should apply to the
imposition of criminal penalties on remand following his successful prior
appeal; reversed the trial court’s denial of the former husband’s request
for reimbursement due under the divorce decree; and vacated the award
of attorney’s fees to the former wife. 85
In the underlying contempt action, the former husband was found in
contempt for failing to execute a quitclaim deed and Qualified Domestic
Relations Order within the time required by the decree and ordered to
purge his contempt by making payments to render the property at issue
marketable and to make payments on the home equity line of credit on
the residence until it was sold. 86 The supreme court in Sponsler II
affirmed the finding of contempt but reversed as to the sanctions on the
grounds that they impermissibly modified the terms of the decree. 87 In
the interim between Sponsler II and the trial court’s order on remand,
the evidentiary posture of the case changed because the property at issue
had been sold and civil contempt was no longer practicable because
coercing compliance with the divorce decree would be impossible. 88
Accordingly, the “law of the case rule” was no longer applicable, and the
trial court was authorized to impose criminal rather than civil contempt
penalties. 89 Under the presumption of vindictiveness set forth in North
Carolina v. Pearce, 90 the court of appeals found no merit in the
appellant’s argument that the imposition of criminal contempt penalties
following remand violated his due process rights. 91 While due process
demands “‘that vindictiveness must play no part in the resentencing of
one who has successfully appealed his original conviction[,]’ . . . . [a]ny
presumption of vindictiveness arising from the imposition of criminal
contempt punishment was rebutted by objective evidence establishing

301 Ga. 600, 800 S.E.2d (2017).
Sponsler III, 353 Ga. App. at 627, 838 S.E.2d at 923–24.
85 Id. at 632–34, 838 S.E.2d at 926–28.
86 Id. at 630, 838 S.E.2d at 925.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969).
91 Sponsler III, 353 Ga. App. at 631, 838 S.E.2d at 926 (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89
S. Ct. 2072 (1969)).
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the change in circumstances that existed after remand.” 92 Accordingly,
the trial court’s imposition of criminal rather than civil contempt
sanctions following remand was not erroneous. 93
The court of appeals’ opinion in Sullivan v. Harper 94 both clarified the
boundaries of a party’s final decision-making authority in matters of
custody and offered insight into the proper approach to evaluating a
prohibition on “disparagement” by one former spouse against the other. 95
There, the parties had two minor children, and the consent parenting
plan incorporated into their final judgment and decree of divorce
provided, in pertinent part: that the mother (Sullivan) would have final
decision-making authority “on medical issues;” that both parties would
have the right to receive information, records, paperwork, and documents
concerning the children and to request such information from providers;
and that neither would “disparage the other parent to any teachers,
coaches, activity providers, doctors, tutors, dentists, healthcare
professionals, or anyone else who may be involved in the children’s life in
a similar capacity.” 96 When one of the children began seeing a new
psychologist, the mother filled out a questionnaire in which she referred
to the father (Harper) as “manipulative and childlike;” stated that that
he lived with his “girlfriend,” who was in fact his fiancée; claimed that he
emotionally abused or neglected the child and minimized bullying the
child experienced; and identified the father as having a substantial
mental health history. 97 Sullivan further objected to Harper bringing his
“girlfriend” to feedback meetings with the therapist and told the
therapist to consult her before releasing documents or information to the
father. Harper filed a motion for contempt alleging that Sullivan had
violated the parenting plan by disparaging him, interfering with his
access to records, and misrepresenting the scope of her medical final
decision-making authority. 98
After a hearing, the trial court found Sullivan in willful contempt for
disparaging Harper, interfering with Harper’s access to records,
instructing the doctors not to permit Harper’s fiancée to attend meetings
with Harper, and requesting to be consulted before the therapists

92 Sponsler III, 353 Ga. App. at 631–32, 838 S.E.2d at 926 (quoting Georgia Real Estate
Commission v. Home, 141 Ga. App. 226, 232, 223 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1977)).
93 Sponsler III, 353 Ga. App. at 631–32, 838 S.E.2d at 926.
94 352 Ga. App. 427, 834 S.E.2d 921 (2019).
95 Id. at 434–36, 834 S.E.2d at 927–28.
96 Id. at 428–30, 834 S.E.2d at 923–24.
97 Id. at 428–29, 834 S.E.2d at 923.
98 Id. at 429, 834 S.E.2d at 923–24.
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released information to the child’s father. 99 Sullivan appealed. 100 On
review, the court of appeals examined the scope of “final decision-making
authority” and concluded that the trial court properly clarified the
divorce decree by determining that Sullivan’s medical decision-making
authority did not give her the right to dictate whether a third party could
attend feedback sessions with Harper where the child was not present. 101
The court of appeals also affirmed the finding of disparagement. 102
Although the term was not defined in the parenting plan, its common use
supported the trial court’s conclusion that Sullivan calling Harper
“manipulative” and “childlike” could be construed as disparaging despite
her professed intent simply to provide relevant information—although
the court of appeals was careful to note that while parents may offer
honest answers to diagnostic questions intended to aid the medical
provider, “this can be done in a way that is not disparaging.” 103 The
reviewing court affirmed the finding that Sullivan had willfully
interfered with Harper’s access to the records, but reversed the trial
court’s determination that Sullivan was in contempt for refusing to allow
the fiancée to attend the therapy sessions because the decree was
sufficiently ambiguous as to the scope of Sullivan’s medical
decision-making authority that the trial court found it proper to clarify
the same: a person may not be found in contempt for violating an order
that does not expressly “inform him in definite terms as to the duties
thereby imposed upon him.” 104
VII. EQUITABLE DIVISION OF PROPERTY
The Georgia Court of Appeals clarified the interaction of the
presumption of gifts to the marital estate and the “source of funds rule”
in Dixon v. Dixon, 105 which involved the husband’s use of unallocated
personal injury settlement funds to purchase a home for the parties
during the marriage. 106 Approximately four years after the parties
married, the husband was involved in a major accident, and the wife
stopped working to care for him. The husband received a million-dollar
personal injury settlement, from which he ultimately received a net of
$595,380.27. He used a portion of the proceeds to pay the parties’ joint
Id. at 429, 834 S.E.2d at 924.
Id. at 430, 834 S.E.2d at 924.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 435, 834 S.E.2d at 927.
103 Id. at 434–35, n.5, 834 S.E.2d at 927, n.5.
104 Id. at 436, 834 S.E.2d 928 (quoting Hughes v. Browne, 217 Ga. App. 567, 568, 459
S.E.2d 170, 172 (1995)).
105 352 Ga. App. 169, 170 834 S.E.2d 309, 312 (2019).
106 Id. at 169, 834 S.E.2d at 311.
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bankruptcy liabilities and used roughly $240,000 of the remainder to
purchase a residence for the parties as joint tenants with right of
survivorship. 107 Fourteen months later, the husband filed for divorce and
sought partial summary judgment asking the court to classify the
settlement proceeds and the residence as non-marital property or, in the
alternative, to apply the source of funds rule, 108 which apportions the
marital residence between separate and marital property interests based
upon the respective separate and marital contributions of each spouse. 109
The trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment, finding
the settlement proceeds to be the husband’s separate property, and
determined that (a) the husband had converted a portion of the
settlement proceeds to marital assets by titling the house jointly, but (b)
the source of funds rule still operated to render the marital residence a
wholly non-marital asset. The wife appealed. 110
Applying the so-called “analytical approach” to the classification of a
personal injury award as separate or marital property, the court of
appeals determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether some portion of the proceeds could be shown to constitute
marital property so as to preclude summary judgment; however,
summary judgment was proper against the wife as to her claim that a
portion of the settlement should be considered her separate property as
compensation for loss of consortium because she was not a party to the
settlement and no evidence suggested that she had made a claim for loss
of consortium. 111 Regarding the classification of the marital residence,
the trial court correctly determined that the husband had made a gift to
the marital estate by titling the parties’ home jointly, but erred in
applying the source of funds rule to reclassify the property as separate. 112
While the source of funds rule may be applied to return a non-marital
investment to a spouse who contributed separate property to a marital
asset, it may not be used to wholly reclassify a marital asset as
separate. 113
VIII. VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS
As a question of first impression, the Georgia Court of Appeals held
in Enlow v. Enlow 114 that, under Georgia’ Uniform Voidable Transactions
Id. at 169–70, 834 S.E.2d at 311.
See Thomas v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 377 S.E.2d 666 (1989).
109 Dixon, 352 Ga. App. at 170, 834 S.E.2d at 311.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 171–73, 834 S.E.2d at 313–14.
112 Id. at 174, 834 S.E.2d at 314–15.
113 Id.
114 352 Ga. App. 865, 836 S.E.2d 128 (2019).
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Act (UVTA), 115 property transfers made pursuant to a previously entered
divorce decree may be subject to avoidance. 116 There, the father of a
minor child threatened to sue the child’s grandfather for molesting the
child. Shortly thereafter, the child’s grandfather and grandmother
transferred five parcels of real property they owned jointly through a
trust to the grandmother as trustee of a trust in her name alone. The
quitclaim deeds to the five parcels were filed on August 8, 2016, and on
August 16, 2016, the grandparents signed a divorce settlement awarding
all five parcels to the grandmother which was incorporated as part of the
final judgment and decree of divorce entered on November 18, 2016. In
October 2017, the child’s father sued the grandfather on the child’s behalf
for, inter alia, fraud and fraudulent conveyance under the UVTA. The
plaintiff-appellant prevailed on a motion for partial summary judgment
as to her tort claims, but the trial court denied summary judgment on the
UVTA claim on the grounds that the UVTA could not be used to set aside
the terms of an otherwise valid divorce decree. 117
The trial court erred in determining that the UVTA was not available
to set aside the terms of the grandparents’ divorce decree. 118 The Act
defines a “transfer” as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an
asset or an interest in an asset and includes payment of money, release,
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance,” 119 which is a very
broad definition and does not by its plain terms exclude the equitable
division of assets incident to a divorce. 120 Finding no authority from
Georgia’s higher courts, the court of appeals reviewed the statutory
statement of intent that the UVTA “shall be applied and construed to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to
the subject of this article among states enacting the [UVTA];” 121 surveyed
the application of the UVTA and its equivalents in other jurisdictions;
and determined the dominant trend to be that the UVTA may be applied
to divorce settlement agreements. 122 In the absence of authority to the
contrary, the trial court’s determination that the UVTA could not be so
applied conflicted with the legislative intent behind the statute and was,
thus, erroneous. 123
O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-70 to 18-2-85 (2020).
Enlow, 352 Ga. App. at 866, 836 S.E.2d at 129.
117 Id. at 866–67, 836 S.E.2d at 129.
118 Id. at 867, 836 S.E.2d at 130.
119 O.C.G.A. § 18-2-71 (2020).
120 Enlow, 352 Ga. App. at 867–68, 836 S.E.2d at 130.
121 O.C.G.A. § 18-2-83 (2020).
122 Enlow, at 868–69, 836 S.E.2d at 130–31 (alteration in original).
123 Id. at 869, 836 S.E.2d at 131.
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IX. GRANDPARENT CUSTODY
The opinion in Hannah v. Hatcher 124 clarifies the statutory provisions
granting standing to grandparents to seek custody of children when both
parents are living. The paternal grandparents of the minor child sought
emergency and permanent custody of their grandchild, alleging that they
had been primary caregivers for most of the child’s life, the child’s parents
were unmarried, the biological father—who had not legitimated the
child—was incarcerated, the child’s mother had executed an agreement
to give them temporary guardianship, and both parents were unfit. 125
Following a show-cause hearing at which neither of the child’s parents
appeared, the trial court entered an order indicating that since the child’s
biological father had not legitimated the child, it could not award the
paternal grandparents custody under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1), 126 then
dismissed the case. 127 In doing so, the trial court determined that the fact
that the biological father could still choose to pursue legitimation affected
the analysis of whether the biological father’s parents had standing to
seek custody. 128 This was error. 129 O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) authorizes the
biological grandparents of a minor child to seek custody without regard
for whether the biological father has legitimated his relationship with
the child or not. 130
X. LEGITIMATION, PATERNITY, AND ASSISTED CONCEPTION
On appeal from a petition for an order of parentage parallel to a
divorce action, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s
ruling that the wife, who gave birth to a child conceived with a donor egg
by in vitro fertilization (IVF), qualified as an “intended recipient parent”
so as to authorize her to seek and be issued an order of parentage under
the Option of Adoption Act, 131 and she was not prohibited from doing so
even though the concurrent divorce action was pending in a different
county. 132 During the marriage, the parents had a child through IVF
using an egg from an anonymous donor which was fertilized by the
father’s sperm and carried to term by the mother. During the parents’
subsequent divorce, the father took the position that the mother had no
rights to custody of the child because she was not a biological, legal, or
352 Ga. App. 186, 834 S.E.2d 307 (2019).
Id. at 186, 834 S.E.2d at 307.
126 O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) (2020).
127 Hannah, 352 Ga. App. at 187–88, 834 S.E.2d at 307–08.
128 Id. at 188, 834 S.E.2d at 308.
129 Id. at 189, 834 S.E.2d at 309.
130 Id.
131 O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-40 to 19-8-43 (2020).
132 In the Interest of C.B., 353 Ga. App. 363, 363, 837 S.E.2d 517, 518 (2019).
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adoptive parent. The wife then petitioned for and obtained, in a separate
proceeding in another court, an order declaring her to be the legal parent.
The husband’s motion for a new trial or to set the parentage order aside
was denied, and he appealed. 133
The Option of Adoption Act permits an intended parent who receives
an embryo transfer to seek and obtain an order declaring that person a
legal parent even though they may not have a biological relationship to
the conceived child. 134 Evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion
that the mother qualified as an “intended recipient parent” under
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-40(5), 135 and contrary to the father’s argument no
language in the Act limited its application to adoptions of embryos by
third parties. 136 Further, the Act specifically requires a petition for an
order of parentage to be filed “in the county in which any petitioner or
any respondent resides,” so despite the pendency of the divorce in Fulton
County, the mother was authorized to seek the order of parentage in her
county of residence, Clayton. 137 There was no requirement that the cases
be consolidated and since the subject matter of the mother’s petition
differed from that of the divorce, she was not prohibited from prosecuting
two actions against the father in different courts simultaneously. 138
The court of appeals addressed whether Georgia recognizes the tort of
“wrongful birth” after the parents of a child conceived with donor sperm
sued the sperm bank operator under a variety of theories of tort in
Norman v. Xytex Corporation.. 139 As the child grew up, he was diagnosed
with ADHD and an inherited blood disorder, began experiencing suicidal
and homicidal ideations, and was prescribed “various medications
The
including
anti-depressants
and
an
anti-psychotic.” 140
appellant-parents alleged that the donor had “completely fabricated” his
sperm donor application and sought damages under theories including,
inter alia, fraud, misrepresentation, products liability, negligence,
breach of warranty, and specific performance. 141 The defendant
corporation moved to dismiss on the ground that the various tort theories
were effectively a claim for wrongful birth, which is not a recognized tort
Id. at 363, 837 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 364–66, 837 S.E.2d at 518.
135 O.C.G.A. § 19-8-40(5) (2020).
136 In the Interest of C.B., 353 Ga. App. at 366, 837 S.E.2d at 519–20.
137 O.C.G.A. § 19-8-42(b) (2020); In the Interest of C.B., 353 Ga. App. at 367, 837 S.E.2d
at 520.
138 In the Interest of C.B., 353 Ga. App. at 367, 837 S.E.2d at 520; see generally, O.C.G.A.
§ 9-2-5(a)(2020) (“No plaintiff may prosecute two actions in the courts at the same time for
the same cause of action and against the same party.”).
139 350 Ga. App. 731, 830 S.E.2d 267 (2019).
140 Id. at 731, 830 S.E.2d at 268.
141 Id. at 731–32, 830 S.E.2d at 268–69.
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claim in Georgia, and the trial court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims
on that basis except the specific performance claim. The parents argued
on appeal that the trial court had erred in construing their complaint as
one for wrongful birth. 142
On review, the court of appeals recited the Supreme Court’s prior
ruling that “[a]n action for ‘wrongful birth’ is brought by the parents of
an impaired child and alleges basically that, but for the treatment or
advice provided by the defendant[s], the parents would have aborted the
fetus, thereby preventing the birth of the child,” 143 even though the
complainants may “attempt to characterize what is, fundamentally, a
wrongful birth claim as some other cause of action.” 144 Georgia recognizes
causes of action for wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception, but the
key distinction is that both of those causes of action arise where “the
alleged negligence resulted in undesired conception.” 145 Where, instead,
the parents desired the conception, but allege that they would not have
conceived had they known in advance that the child would suffer the
impairments caused by a provider’s alleged negligence or wrongful acts,
there can be no recovery: “[a]s the Supreme Court of Georgia stated[,] ‘we
are unwilling to say that life, even life with severe impairments, may
ever amount to a legal injury.’” 146
XI. CONCLUSION
While the 2019–2020 survey period did not see major paradigm shifts
in the law of domestic relations, the higher courts issued a number of
important clarifications regarding the application of the law to peculiar
sets of facts. The outbreak of COVID-19 in March 2020 caused a
significant disruption to the operation of the courts and the lives of
millions of Georgians, and the effects on litigants and resultant litigation
are likely to be felt in the 2020–2021 survey period and beyond.

Id. at 732, 830 S.E.2d at 269.
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v.
Abelson, 260 Ga. 711, 713, 398 S.E.2d 557, 560).
144 Id. at 732, 830 S.E.2d at 269.
145 Id. at 733, 830 S.E.2d at 269.
146 Id. at 734, 830 S.E.2d at 270 (punctuation omitted) (quoting Atlanta Obstetrics &
Gynecology Group, 260 Ga. at 715, 398 S.E.2d at 561 (1990)).
142
143

